by Jack Lee
Our current airline security models were based on threats from hijackings back in the 1970’s. Since then hijackings have been replaced with more creative methods of terrorism, but the system has not evolved to meet those new threats.
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9/11 need not have happened if we had been the least little bit proactive rather than reactive. For example, proactive changes would have mandated that the access door to the cockpit be secured during flight. The flight attendants and airline pilots associations demanded that simple change long before 9/11, but it was deemed an unnecessary expenditure. After 9/11 the wisdom of a secure door became obvious even to the hardended bureaucrats.
Our screening procedures still have not evolved enough to meet the newest threats. We’re still scanning for metallic objects on persons or in the luggage, but the greatest threats since 9/11 has come in the form of non-metallic explosive devices. Not one terrorist threat to US aircraft in the past nine years has involved a metallic object. So obviously we need a method for screening both metallic and non-metallic objects and with technology that will give us a high degree of accurate threat assessment.
We need to use our resources more effectively and efficiently. Humans are ill suited for threat detection, but technology isn’t. Human’s should be used for threat resolution and machines for threat detection. Humans poking through your luggage is pretty much just a waste of time and even a pat search often fails to detect threats, so using humans in this manner is a gross misallocation of resources and it comes with a high degree of failure.
The most sophisticated screening devices must still rely on the human operator and we really need to improve in this area. I think TSA has improved the human element quite a bit, but its still not enough. In many cases the persons operating the detection devices have been criticized for their inattentiveness, lack of motivation, and in a few cases inappropriate employment histories. The later has been improving too and at least we are no longer hiring illegal aliens for airport security. But, I can’t underscore this human problem enough. Until we have the kind of quality people doing the right tasks, and I am talking about intelligent people that can effectively use high tech screening devices, we will always fall far short of our goal.
It is assinine to shut down a whole airport because some idiot passenger went out the wrong exit door. Where’s the judgement? We have to get real and hire people capable of making a sound judgment call on minor risk violations or we will make a mess out of security.
At this time we have about 1.5 million passengers moving through airport terminals every day. This presents a huge logistical problem for security. Most experts have concluded that the time needed to effectively screen each passenger must be under 10 seconds or the system slows down so much we back up air traffic and cause unecessary delays.
Technology exists to move passengers along at the rate of one screening per each 6 seconds interval. Human intervention after a screening should not exceed more than a few minutes before that person gets a go or no go to board. Keep in mind the human intervention is only done when a “possible” threat is detected. It does not take that much time to determine if it was a real threat or not!
We need the following right now:
security teams of selected, cross-trained, motivated personnel performing appropriate tasks, with continuing measurement and feedback of their performance;
an arsenal of technologies and procedures that can be quickly configured and deployed to meet probable threats; and
timely intelligence continuously disseminated to security teams on probable adversaries and threat scenarios.
This is so obvious, so why don’t we have it?
Douglas Harris security expert, wrote, “Threats can also come from the many processes that support an airport and the passengers and aircraft it serves: catering, maintenance,
cleaning, ticketing, baggage handling, air traffic control, retail, food services, parking, car rental and others. For example, members of the cleaning staff stashed guns and
grenades in the plane’s washroom to support the hijacking of TWA Flight 847, which led to 17 days of terror in 1985 (Gladwell, 2001). Thus, even perfect threat detection
applied to passengers and their baggage would not necessarily result in acceptable levels of security.”
So you can see that airport security is very complex and its also a very expensive proposition that is never going to be 100% fool proof. But, right now you and I both know beyond any shadow of a doubt…WE’RE NOT GETTING OUR MONIES WORTH! Homeland is just an expensive joke because Napolitano doesn’t know squat about security.
Homeland security is a multi-billon dollar boondoggle that has failed miserably in each of the three key areas previously noted. After 8 years of trying we still have widespread communication delays of critical information as well as total failures to pass along key information to collaborative information hubs that could leverage the information received.
There are many more things I could think that need fixing, but for obvious reasons I can’t discuss all of them here or the enemy would pick up on our methods and would just do something different. For instance I can’t talk about what precise information is currently used to flag an individual for the no fly list, I can only tell you the system is inadequate. I can’t tell you the typical “tags” used in an intel report for threat assessment or the precise methodology for disseminating and leveraging threat analysis. Nor can I discuss the exact nature of profiling for threat assessments, even though Homeland Security is barring us from profiling. It still is a tool used in other more enlightened countries. The Israeli profiling method in conjunction with technology has been provided a high degree of accuracy on threat assessments that far exceed our own security measures.
Until Homeland starts doing what their mission statement called for and we begin actively profiling based on established, proven models, we will continue to have unacceptable levels of security breaches.
At this time I would rate our security at a dismal 50% to 65% at best effectiveness, but with a little tweaking here and there, we could improve tremendously. And then we would be in the range of acceptable performance weighed against “cost verses risk”, that is something around 80-85% effective. A 100% effective system will never be achieved and if we did, it would be crippling to the airline industry and in doing so it would be achieving the primary goal of terrorism.
Look, I bet you could do a far better job than Janet Napolitano and so could 10,000 other people that work in mid-level and up security jobs…but, that’s not who the President asked, is it? No, he selected Napolitano because she is a liberal democrat in good party standing with the party. But, when the truth comes out as to what this dipstick knows about national security….she flunks, she’s as clueless as our amature Pres. They’re both just political hacks making it up as they go and hoping nobody notices.
